Abstract
INTRODUCTION Do local units of self-government
1 have the capacity to borrow? For an answer to this question, it is necessary to establish a system for the evaluation of the credit risk of local units. Numerous theoretical and empirical research works speak amply of the importance of this problem. Competent government bodies -before they give guarantees for local unit borrowing -need to evaluate the credit risk of local units. In some countries, such as Mexico, a credit risk evaluation system has become an integral part of the institutional framework for local unit borrowing (Liu and Tan, 2009) . There are several possible factors contributing to the importance of the estimation of local unit credit risk. They include fi scal decentralisation, the development of a market-oriented borrowing policy, a wish to augment creditworthiness, a search for better borrowing conditions and the strengthening of the legislative framework (Gaillard, 2009) 2 .
1 Below, the term local units will be used. 2 Apart from the legislative framework, which is directed to the establishment of fiscal discipline at the local level, the regulation of the banking system in recent time contributes to the ever-greater importance of the assessment of local unit credit risk. Although the initial capital agreement (Basel I) of 1988 determined the basic parameters for risk management and capital adequacy, the Basel II regulatory framework gives detailed guidelines for the calculation of capital requirements (particularly for credit and operating risk). The first pillar of the Basel II regulatory framework (minimum capital requirements) sets the rules for computing credit risk through: (a) the standardised approach; (b) the foundation internal rating based approach; and (c) the advanced internal rating based approach. Each of these approaches serves, ultimately, to calculate capital requirements (what the banks have to set aside to cover risks of exposure to given loans). At the bottom of the calculation of capital requirements is the likelihood of default (credit risk) for each individual loan or debtor. In accord with this banks that -in any way at all -loan money to local units should have at their disposal (in the context of calculation of capital requirements) information about the credit risk associated with local government units.
The credit risk of local units is on the whole not higher than the sovereign ceiling. Bearing in mind that central government will usually guarantee that the local units will meet their liabilities when the loans are being taken out, credit risk should not be much lower, either. However, the diverse status of local units within some state, the differences in fi scal capacities, population size and inadequately defi ned rules for the allocation of tax revenue and many other factors indicate considerable differences in their fi nancial stability (Carnevale and Coulton, 2006) .
The objective of the paper is to ascertain the indicators that to the greatest extent determine the credit risk of local units and to investigate their impact on the credit risk of local units in Croatia. The paper, then, tests out the hypothesis of the effect of different indicators on local unit credit risk in Croatia. Part two of the paper provides a theoretical framework for the evaluation of credit risk and an explanation of the selection of the appropriate method for evaluation. Part three describes the variables that might infl uence the credit risk of local units. Part four has a description of the model and the results of econometric analysis. In this part, the parameters of the model are evaluated and the comparison of the model predicted and evaluated (real) value of credit risk is presented. Part fi ve contains conclusions and recommendations for further research.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The evaluation of credit risk in academic and specialised literature appeared with much more seriousness in the middle of the 20 th century. Yet in spite of the progress made by economic science, so far no consensus has been attained concerning the best methodology or the set of indicators (input variables) that ought to be used for an evaluation of the credit risk of a given group of debtors.
In the fi rst papers concerning credit risk evaluation, authors attempted to predict debtor bankruptcy by using discriminant analysis (Altman, 1968; Carleton and Lerner 1969, as well as, Raman, 1981) and regression analysis (Hastie, 1972; Ohlson, 1980 and Zmijewski, 1984; Lewis, Patton and Green, 1988 and Anderson, 2007) . A little earlier, Fisher (1959) used regression analysis for the investigations of the determinants of risk premiums on corporate bonds. Henley and Hand (1996) used cluster analysis (nearest neighbour method) and in recent times the more contemporary approaches of estimating risk by the application of neural networks (Odom and Sharda, 1990 ) and the genetic algorithm (Shin and Han, 1999; Shin and Lee, 2002; Ong, Huang and Tzeng, 2005) , as well as support vectors (Huang et al., 2004) and fuzzy logic (Wang, Wang and Lai, 2005 as well as Hájek and Olej, 2007) have been used.
TABLE 1 Traditional approaches to the evaluation of credit risk

Method
Authors Discriminant analysis Altman (1968) , Carleton and Lerner (1969) , Raman (1981) Linear regression (OLS) Hastie (1972) , West (1970 ), Fisher (1959 Logit Ohlson (1980) , Lewis, Patton and Green (1988) , Ederington (1985) Probit Zmijewski (1984) , Jackson and Boyd (1988), Gentry, Whitford and Newhold (1988) Cluster analysis Henley and Hand (1996) , Chatterjee and Barcun (1970) , Hájek and Olej (2006) Genetic algorithm Shin and Han (1999) , Shin and Lee (2002) , Ong, Huang and Tzeng (2005) Neural network Odom and Sharda (1990) , Piramuthu (1999) The fi rst papers on local unit credit risk appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Carleton and Lerner (1969) , right at the end of the sixties, with their scoring model tested the effects of institutional organisational structure, population, various indebtedness indicators, and rate of tax collection of local units on their credit ratings. Hastie (1972) studied the infl uence of a somewhat larger group of independent variables (indebtedness, economic diversifi cation, population growth and so on) on the yields of municipal bonds. Wallace (1981) considered the correlation of accounting indicators with borrowing costs; Ingram and Copeland (1982) expanded Wallace (1981) by using other variables; Benson, Marks and Raman (1984) examined the correlation of government regulation of accounting procedures and the costs of local unit borrowing. Capeci (1991 Capeci ( , 1994 bore out the contention that the operating characteristics of local units are an important determinant of credit risk and indirectly of the yields on local unit bonds. A large number of recent researches Gaillard (2009), Lipnick, Rattner and Ebrahim (1999) , Liu and Tan (2009) have confi rmed the impact of different indicators of local units on their credit risk.
The credit risk of local units depends on numerous factors that, in principle, can be divided into a few groups. They are institutional framework, economic structure, governance and administration, fi nances and the budget and liquidity and longterm liabilities (Gaillard, 2009; Lipnick, 1999; and Liu and Tan, 2009 This paper will examine not only the usual credit risk indicators but also the effect of one of such specifi c variables on the local unit credit risk in Croatia. In general, it is thought that a local unit is less risky if the share of its own sources of revenue in total income is greater. Accordingly, local units that rely to a large extent on unstable sources of income (intergovernmental transfers) are riskier. The problem of the allocation of aid funding to local units is particularly complex if the political aspects are taken into consideration. Numerous investigations from the end of the last century considered the interdependence of political economy and the allocation of aid. In the course of time two prevailing theories developed. Cox and McCubbins (1986) , the founders of one of them, think that the ruling structure (central government) in its allocation of transfers privileges those local units in which it has political support (i.e. local units with a politically compatible gover-nment). An alternative theory, the main representatives of which are Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1998) , says that funding from the central budget is allocated to local units in which voter preferences are variable, i.e. local units in which swing voters predominate. Although it is still not clear which of these two theories is more correct, the issue of the effect of political factors on the allocation of aid from the central government budget to local units is an academic problem from the domain of political economy. Therefore, this paper will endeavour to ascertain if there is any infl uence from political factors on local unit credit risk in Croatia.
DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RISK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
In Croatia there is no instrument for local government unit bankruptcy, as there is in some countries (in Hungary, for example), because of which the standard evaluation of credit risk on the basis of historical values of bankruptcy that either came about or did not come about (binary variable -dichotomous) is not possible. Hence, credit risk has to be approximated in some other way. Credit risk can be characterised as the risk of a debtor's obligations not being met in time and/or in full. This risk, then, can be approximated by the proportion of outstanding liabilities created within a year in total liabilities due in that year. Accordingly, the local unit credit risk can be approximated by the ratio of outstanding liabilities in a given year to total expenditure of local units arising in the same period 3 (the default proxy).
Local unit credit risk -approximated in the way described above -ranged in 2008 from 0% to 70.27% (table 2). The asymmetry coeffi cient (α 3 ) indicates a positively asymmetrical distribution of frequencies, which is as expected because of the nature of the statistical set. Local units are low-risk entities and the concentration of empirical values is reduced with a rise in credit risk. The mean value of a statistical set shows an average value of approximated credit risk of local units of 7.01%. Data for the explanatory variables relate to 556 municipalities and cities in Croatia, and are calculated for 2008 pursuant to the fi nancial reports of the local gover-nment units, of the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (economic and demographic data) and the State Electoral Commission (data about elections of members of the representative bodies of local and regional government). The dependent variable default_proxy is calculated as the ratio of outstanding liabilities of local units to total liabilities due in the observed period. Many factors potentially infl uence the variable default_proxy and the credit risk of local units. With the objective of identifying the main determinants of credit risk, a group of 27 independent variables is analysed (appendix 2, table A4), which by the inductive method is reduced to the 11 most relevant 4 independent variables (table 3) . The institutional framework for local government in Croatia distinguishes local units that have the status of municipality or that of city. There are good reasons then to suppose that the actual status (of city or municipality) will a priori determine a larger or smaller credit risk of a local unit. Similarly it is supposed that in transition countries politics still has an important role in the fi nancing of local units. In line with political criteria, favoured local units can be privileged in the system of fi nancing, which means that their fi nancial position (and also, indirectly, their credit risk) can be improved to the detriment of the others. Variables related to demographic indicators (lst_nst and une_lst) are interesting because the local units in Croatia on the whole rely on revenue from shared taxes (in particular on income tax), which is directly related to the demographic structure of the local units (number and structure of employed persons) while the proportion of exports in GDP (izvoz_BDP) refl ects the economic development of the local unit. The proportion of income tax in operating revenue (pdoh_tp) shows self-suffi ciency in the fi nancing of a local unit (since a local unit with a greater proportion is less dependent on uncertain funding from the central government budget). Other indicators derived from operating revenue (nos_tp, id_tp and nfl _tp) show on the whole different aspects of the ability to fi nance liabilities and should in a very great measure determine local unit credit risk. Finally, liquidity indicators (got_tr and od_got) measure the capacity to fi nance operating expenditure and to service debt with the most liquid asset -cash. The coeffi cients of correlation of the dependent variable and the eleven independent variables (potential determinants of local unit credit risk) are presented in table A5 (appendix 2). Signs of the coeffi cients of correlation are on the whole in accordance with the expected infl uence of the observed determinants on local unit credit risk -except for the indicator of the political structure of local government. The expected negative infl uence of political compatibility between local and national government was founded on the expectation that the ruling structure would in the allocation of aid funding from the national budget favour the local units in which it had political support, which would ultimately mean the fi nancial capacity of such local units being greater (the credit risk should be smaller). The matrix of correlation partially confi rmed this hypothesis because of the negative correlation of the variables politika and pdoh_tp (politics and income tax in operating revenue). This shows that aid funding from the central government budget will probably be more often sent to local units the government of which is compatible with the state government making the proportion of revenue from income tax in operating revenue for those local units smaller. However, the reasons for a positive effect of political compatibility between local and national government on the credit risk of local units remain to be explained. One reason might be a more tolerant approach when "favoured" local units are not prompt in their fi nancial dealings because of cronyism while another might be linked with the expenditure side of their budgets, which is immoderate as a result of excessive demands.
MODEL FOR THE EVALUATION OF LOCAL UNIT CREDIT RISK
For the modelling of local unit credit risk, a number of statistical and non-statistical tools are used, the applicability of them depending on the data set. The dependent variable (local unit bankruptcy) is, for the aforementioned reasons, not observed directly. The value of the latent variable of interest (default_proxy 5 ) is for a non-negligible part of the sample equal to zero (23.56%), and at the same time it is continuously distributed on the interval [0,1]. Because of the characteristic fi nancial operations as well as of the status of local government units in the public sector, their credit risk is expectedly relatively low and there is not a single local unit with the value of the default proxy equal to 1. Hence for the analysis of local unit credit risk a censored regression model (the Tobit model) is used (Greene, 2008; and Wooldridge, 2006) .
The credit risk of local units Y is a continuous random variable that has a positive value and can be zero with a positive probability. Furthermore, the calculated proxy of the local unit's credit risk (default_proxy) is a latent variable in the model. This is theoretically justifi ed and has the aim of setting up the basic criteria for the determination of default (which could be identifi ed with local unit bankruptcy). Over the course of time, this would enable the substitution of a continuously distributed variable credit risk proxy with a binary variable that would signify the ultimate realisation of default that either happened (1) or did not happen (0).
In cases when the variable Y is censored (restricted), the values in a given range are transformed into a single value. In the case of the current research, the dependent variable Y is censored to 0. If the latent variable -default_proxy -is signifi ed by Y*, then the observed variable Y is equal to the latent variable in the case in which default_proxy>0. It has to be mentioned that, because of the (theoretically justifi ed) low value of the local units' credit risk, no values of default_proxy=1 are observed in the sample so the dependent variable in the model is not censored by the upper value of 1.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Let us suppose that for every observation Y there is a latent variable Y* which is described by the following regression model:
where β′ = (β 0 , β 1 ,..., β 11 ) are the unknown parameters of the model, X i = (1, X 1 , X 2 ,..., X 11 ) i , and the variables X 1 , X 2 ,..., X 11 are in order status (city or municipality), politika (binary variable that has the value of 1 if the political structure of the government at the local level is compatible with that at the national level -the same political party, otherwise having the value of 0), the proportion of local exports in local GDP (izvoz_BDP), the proportion of local population in the total population of the Republic of Croatia (lst_nst), the proportion of local unemployed in total local population (une_lst), the proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue (pdoh_tp), the proportion of net operating surplus in operating revenue (nos_tpi), the proportion of cash in operating expenditure (got_tri), the proportion of debt servicing in cash (od_got), the proportion of direct debt 6 in operating revenue (id_tp), the proportion of net fi nancial liabilities in operating revenue (nfl _tp), while ε i are independent identically distributed normal 7 random variables of zero expectation and variance σ The term direct debt relates to all liabilities for bonds and loans and does not cover contingent liabilities arising from guarantees, outstanding liabilities and other indirect debt categories. 7 In the case that errors are not normally distributed or are not homoscedastic, the estimators obtained by the maximum likelihood method will not be consistent. In this case the parameters will be estimated by maximum log-quasi-likelihood (QML estimator). The QML estimator is robust with respect to a false assumption about the distribution of the dependent variable, it is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. At the same time, in the event of heteroscedasticity of errors, this can be indirectly modelled in the log-quasilikelihood function.
only its values greater than zero are observed. Since the observed limited dependent variable cannot have a value of less than zero, the truncated distribution from which such values will derive refers to the part of the continuous distribution above zero and to the likelihood function of the discrete variable in zero. Hence for the estimation of the parameters it is necessary to fi nd those values of parameters β and σ that maximise the following function ( ) 
where φ is the standard normal density function, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 1 (Y>0) denotes the indicator function that assumes the value of 1 on the set {Y>0}, and 0 on the set {Y=0}.
Marginal effects in the Tobit model, which represent the partial effect of an individual variable on the local unit credit risk, are not given by the values of the regression coeffi cients β, but by the expression (Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2006) :
According to expression (3) it follows that the marginal effects given with the Tobit model are equal to the product of the marginal effects of the latent variable Y*, or the coeffi cients β, and the proportion of non-limit observations in the sample.
RESULTS OF ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The results of econometric analysis obtained by maximising the log-likelihood function (2) for the Tobit model 8 are presented below. In the estimation procedure of the Tobit model, and in order to determine the asymptotic properties of the obtained estimators by the maximum likelihood method, there are two fundamental assumptions: errors are normally distributed and they are homoscedastic. In the fi rst step in estimating the parameters of the model, the estimators are obtained by maximising the log-likelihood function (the ML estimator). If the assumptions of the model are met (normal distribution and error homoscedasticity), the ML estimators are consistent, asymptotically normal and effi cient. In order to examine the properties and qualities of the estimator, the testing of the assumptions and general signifi cance of the Tobit model is carried out with the use of Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistics 9 for testing Tobit specifi cation as compared to the alter-native to the model that is not linear in its explanatory variables and contains an error that can be heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed. The test rejects the zero hypothesis, showing that the Tobit specifi cation of the model assumptions is not suitable for consistent estimation of the parameters. In order to obtain consistent estimators the heteroscedasticity problem was addressed with direct modelling of heteroscedasticity using an exponential function in the log-likelihood function with σ i = e˜x i γ , where, γ = (γ 0 , γ 1 ,..., γ 9 )' and X i = (1, X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 5 , X 6 , X 8 , X 9 , X 10 , X 11 ).
10 If the errors are not normally distributed, the problem is usually much more demanding for a Tobit model as compared with linear models, and for the purpose of its solution alternative estimates are proposed, as are various methods for testing such, potentially wrong, specifi cations of the model. Thus, in a second step of the estimating procedure, the parameters will be estimated by maximising the quasi log-likelihood function (QML), since quasi maximum likelihood estimator is robust with respect to a false assumption about error or dependent variable distribution. In this way, model estimators are obtained that are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. However, the QML estimator is not asymptotically effi cient, and the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) numerical algorithm is used for the purpose of estimating the variance of the maximum log-likelihood estimator when the initial model is not accurately specifi ed (Greene, 2008) 11 . Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the Tobit regression model, the corresponding marginal effects and the corresponding standard errors. The table also gives the estimators obtained by the least squares method (OLS), in spite of their lack of consistency, since in empirical analysis it can be seen that the ML estimators can be obtained as a ratio of OLS estimators and the proportion of non-limit observations in the sample. 12 In addition, marginal effects for variables in the model that did not prove to be statistically signifi cant have been excluded from the table.
In order to determine the marginal effects of explanatory variables on local unit credit risk it is necessary to calculate the adjustment factor ÷ ø ö ç è ae F s
for coefficients in the case of continuous explanatory variables X i (Greene, 2008) . 13 For di-10 The variables X 4 and X 7 , that is the percentage of local population in total population and the proportion of net operating surplus were removed from the modelling of variance since by their inclusion the numerical algorithm for the search of maximum function did not converge. Hence one variable at a time was excluded from the demographic structure (X 4 and X 5 ) and one of the indicators derived from operating revenue (X 7 , X 10 and X 11 ). 11 For estimating the variance using the BHHH algorithm, STATA 10.1 and EViews7 were used independently; the initial conditions were specified by programme support and not modified in the special case. 12 The results obtained by the OLS estimation, aimed at obtaining an outline insight into the sensitivity of the connection between local unit credit risk and its potential determinants, might indicate an initial guideline with respect to this and enable the monitoring of any possible improvements in the form of results obtained by the analysis of some other model, as well as the estimating procedure. 13 The adjustment factor will be closer to the value of 1 when there are less observations for which Y i =0 (there is no credit risk for a local unit, i.e. it is equal to zero). In the observed sample for 23.56% of local units the approximated credit risk is equivalent to zero.
screet explanatory variables -like the political structure of the government -the determination of marginal effects is not entirely simple, although an approximation with the use of an adjustment factor has proved to be very useful (Wooldridge, 2006) . For the sake of determining the marginal effect of the political structure of government -represented in the model by a binary variable -on local unit credit risk, the expected credit risk will be calculated for both possible values of the variable politika={0,1} and the arithmetical means of the remaining significant variables in the model. The obtained marginal effect comes to 0.02072 and represents the effect of the local units' government political structure on credit risk -all other variables of interest being constant 14 . In other words, if the same political party is in power at local and at national level, it is expected that there will be an increase of the estimated credit risk of 2.1 percentage points. A positive correlation of the political structure of the government and credit risk reveals the fact that the fi nancial operations of local units in Croatia are subject to political infl uence, i.e. that the irregular meeting of fi nancial liabilities of some local government units is heightened from political reasons. The reasons for which local governments that are politically compatible to central government are more irregular in meeting their fi nancial liabilities are unclear, although some of the possible causes of this phenomenon are explained in chapter 3.
The proportion of income tax revenue in operating revenue (pdoh_tp) shows the capacity of a local unit to collect revenue from its own sources, i.e. it shows its fi scal capacity. In general, fi scal capacity is one of the measures of local unit fi nancial stability, so greater fi scal capacity results in smaller credit risk (as borne out by the results of econometric analysis). The ratio of net operating balance and operating revenue (nos_tp) is also negatively correlated with credit risk, for a greater net operating balance shows a surplus of revenue to operating expenditure. The ratios of debt servicing and cash (od_got) and net fi nancial liabilities and operating revenue (nfl _tp) indicate debt burden, i.e. the capacity of servicing debt annuities in cash and the possibility of fi nancing surplus fi nancial liabilities over fi nancial assets from regular activities (operating revenue). Larger values of these variables indicate greater exposure to debt and it is logical that as they rise, the value of credit risk also rises. Finally, the ratio of direct debt and operating revenue (id_tp) refl ects the capacity to fi nance direct debt with operating revenue but the sign of the coeffi cient for this indicator is not entirely logical, i.e. a completely opposite sign was expected because a larger debt in proportion to operating revenue should result in greater credit risk.
RELATIONSHIP OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED VALUES OF CREDIT
RISK
With the aim of examining the fi tting of the local unit credit risk model, the values of the default_proxy variable (approximation of credit risk, i.e. proportion of outstanding due liabilities in total due liabilities) will be compared with those predicted by the Tobit model for both characteristics of the political structure of local government (politika={0,1}). The values of the variables pdoh_tp, nos_tp, nfl _tp, od_got and id_tp are given for each value of the variable of interest. The predicted values for the default_proxy are calculated with the use of the relation (Wooldridge, 2006) :
in the estimated values of the corresponding coeffi cients.
Bearing in mind the fact that the marginal effect of the proportion of revenue from income tax in operating revenue in the Tobit model is by far the greatest, and in addition the frequency range of this variable is fairly broad (from 2.78% to 77.48%), the possible values of the proportion of revenue from income tax are divided into 10 equidistant categories. For each category of the proportion of revenue from income tax in operating revenue there are subsamples of real and predicted values of the default_proxy variable for which the mean value and the median in the corresponding subsample are calculated. In this way, it is possible to graphically display the predictive power of the Tobit model. Graph 1 shows the real and predicted values of the average credit risk of local government units. The variable default_proxy marks the average of observed values for the approximation of credit risk within individual categories. The variables prilagođen_def_pro-xy_vlast and prilagođen_def_proxy in the Tobit model indicate the predicted values of credit risk calculated in the mean values of the ascertained determinants in the case of compatibility and of incompatibility of the political structure of local and national government.
GRAPH 1 Real and predicted values of the average credit risk of local units
Source: Authors' calculation.
The expected values of credit risk in the case of political compatibility between local and national government ( 
CONCLUSION
In Croatian scientifi c and expert literature, the determinants of the credit risk of local government units have not been investigated. The Croatian legislative background does not allow local units to go into bankruptcy, which makes it more diffi cult to investigate their credit risk. In this paper a measure for the approximation of credit risk of local units is defi ned (default proxy) as ratio of outstanding liabilities to all due liabilities in a given period, pursuant to which the existing credit risk of local units is quantifi ed. Because of the characteristics of the dependent variable (default_proxy), an appropriate method for the estimation of the model's parameters is selected. The Tobit model is used to show the effect of the political compatibility of local and national government, the proportion of income tax in operating revenue, the ratio of net operating balance and operating revenue, of the net fi nancial liabilities and the operating revenue, and of direct debt and operating revenue, as well as debt servicing and cash on the local unit credit risk. The main constraint on the research is the absence of any historical data about local unit bankruptcy, which should be expressed by a binary variable. Instead of an observed binary variable (which would enable the estimation of credit risk with the application of a logit or a probit model) the approximation of credit risk (the default_proxy) which assumes continuous values in the interval [0,1], has been used. Apart from that, there are no publicly available data about the factors of local unit credit risk such as institutional framework, economic structure, governance and administration. In future research it remains to test the impact of other independent variables on local unit credit risk and resolve the problem of the dependent variable. The problem of the dependent variable could be solved by determining the critical value of the proposed approximation of credit risk on the basis of which local units could be categorised into risk groups, according to which the dependent variable might be directly observed and take on binary values. Future research might test out the impact of the mentioned indicators on local unit credit risk with the use of other methods -preferably from the realm of artifi cial intelligence.
The proposed model for the estimation of local unit credit risk could be improved. However, in this work local unit credit risk in Croatia is being studied for the fi rst time, and it could be a good point of departure for further research. In addition, the results could be useful to the Ministry of Finance in issuing guarantees and giving consent for local unit borrowing and for the analysis of fi scal risks. The model of estimated local unit credit risk could be used as a good foundation for the calculation of the required yield on the local government bonds and the interest rates on local unit loans. Moody's (2008) . Ratings (2010) .
TABLE A5
Correlation matrix for dependent and selected independent variables Source: Authors' calculation.
